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Abstract: Although analysts have explored many facets of economic growth of
Korea over the last decades, infrastructure investment policies have been discussed
in terms of a simple developmental state framework that emphasizes the role of
bureaucracy. This paper claims that infrastructure investment is a function of
interactive processes affected by demand, supply, politics, and administrative
reaction. While the Korean government did invest in infrastructure in advance of
the growth of demand for it in the 1970s, it has made its major infrastructure
investment since the 1980s. Also, while strong political leadership is frequently
lauded, the problems with the Gyeongbu expressway and the four-rivers project
suggest that political leadership without adequate rational planning and policy
analysis can have undesirable effects. Finally, facing budget constraints and 
pressure to make efficient use of limited resources, the Korean government has
sought to institutionalize a systematic process for managing infrastructure
investment. Hence, the development and utilization of relevant policy analysis
and evaluation methods is necessary.
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INTRODUCTION
It is common knowledge that infrastructure investment is essential for economic
development. As its etymology implies, infrastructure comprises the “installations that
form the basis for any operation or system” (Online Etymological Dictionary). Individual
firms have to pay direct and indirect costs to finance the production of their goods
without the relevant provision of infrastructure. An indication of just how an extensive
and efficient infrastructure is critical for economic development is that infrastructure is
the second pillar of the World Economic Forum’s global competitiveness index. In fact,
the correlation coefficient of the level of infrastructure and overall competitiveness of
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a country ranged as high as between 0.79 and 0.96 in the period 1999-2010. Despite
the importance of infrastructure, however, it is a rare form of capital in most less-
developed countries owing to a scarcity of resources, which does not simply derive
from a lack of resources but also from a waste of whatever limited resources a country
might have to begin with.
Public economics (Stiglitz, 2000; Weimer & Vining, 2005) predicts the possibility
of both under- and oversupply of infrastructure. Its undersupply is predicted by its
nature as both a nonexcludable and nonrivalrous resource. The market would not 
voluntarily supply infrastructure given that it cannot exclude nonpaying consumers
from using infrastructure and given that one’s use of infrastructure does not reduce the
others’ use of it. Due to the nonexclusive and nonrivalrous character of infrastructure,
private companies would not be able to use price mechanisms to make profits were
they to supply it. Consequently, they have less incentive to meet the demand of citi-
zens and provide less in the way of infrastructure than is socially desirable.
On the other hand, oversupply is predicted by the nature of politics. Electorates
consider the construction of infrastructures in their districts to be the responsibility of
politicians, and so promising to build infrastructure improves a candidate’s chance of
being elected. At the same time, private investors want the government pour more
money into infrastructure to support their business and are also often willing to provide
campaign funds for politicians in exchange for more infrastructure investment. As the
consequence, politicians and local governments tend to seek a larger investment budget
than they need. This is the primary reason that infrastructure investment is closely
related to pork barreling politics in which politicians sacrifice national interests by
overspending to satisfy local interests. Politicized decision-making processes result in
the oversupply of infrastructure. How to supply infrastructure is thus both an economic
and political question (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003).
The infrastructure investment experience of Korea is highly impressive given its
quantitative and qualitative expansion over the last six decades. After the end of the
Korean civil war in 1953, the road length of Korea was 26,128km. Yet the proportion
of roads that were paved was only 2.3% (601km), and there was no expressway in
Korea before 1968. As of 2011, however, the road length was 105,930km, among
85,120km of which was paved. Korea also opened Incheon International Airport, rated
the best airport worldwide by Airport Council International for seven years in a row
(2005-2012), despite severe competition with China, Singapore, and Japan. Busan
Port was also ranked the fifth container port in the world as of 2012 and has become
one of hub ports in Asia. Developing countries can learn from this remarkable expansion
of infrastructure in Korea.
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In contrast to Korea, other developing countries have suffered from failing to suffi-
ciently invest in infrastructure. Sometimes, international organizations that supply
funds to developing countries stipulate how those funds are to be spent without taking
domestic needs into account. In other cases, the decision as to how to invest money is
highly affected by political interests that are frequently linked with corruption. Such
problems cause the supply-demand gap and a failure in effective utilization of limited
resources for infrastructure investment.
This paper aims at reviewing the evolution of Korean government’s infrastructure
investment policy by focusing on how the supply and demand of the infrastructure
stock has changed in line with the economic growth of Korea. While the economic
miracle of South Korea has been highly praised in scholarly literature (Amsden, 1989;
Lucas, 1993), little attention has been paid to how the Korean government has expanded
its infrastructure by coping with inefficient supply. One might expect that such an
astonishing growth in Korea’s infrastructure is natural considering the economic
development of the country. However, as this article argues, the Korean government
built the supply infrastructure in advance of demand. More importantly, the government
successfully rationalized infrastructure investment decisions.
KOREA’S DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE: 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF INVESTMENT TRENDS
Definition of Infrastructure
There is no standard definition of infrastructure. In development economics, infra-
structure is defined as “social overhead capital” (Hirschman 1958). The traditional
definition of social overhead capital put emphasis on its “indirect” use of economic
activities to improve productivity, which is distinguishable from economic capital that is
directly connected with the production of a firm. As the literal meaning of “overhead”
suggests, social overhead capital is related to “the general, fixed cost of running a
business, as rent, lighting, and heating expenses, which cannot be charged or attributed
to a specific product or part of the work operation” (http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/overhead ).
The emphasis on the economic function of social economic capital has been 
modified, as certain types of public goods such as parks, museums, the internet, the
water supply and sewage system, education, and public health investment transcend it.
In addition, while transportation service can be used to spur economic development, it
also significantly contributes to improving the quality of life of citizens by enhancing
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accessibility among regions and people. Hence, the term “social economic capital,”
which emphasizes economic function, is less valid than the term “infrastructure,”
whose function is also related to the quality of life of citizens.
Along with the debate over the function of infrastructure, what attributes characterize
infrastructure is also controversial. Nonrivalry and nonexcludability, the two attributes
of the traditional definition of infrastructure in development economics, are primary
characteristics of public goods, such as roads and railways. For instance, if a driver
uses a public road without causing congestion, the use of the road by other drivers at
the same time does not degrade the quality of it. Moreover, if the government allows
users to access the road without charge, there is no ground on which to exclude drivers
who do not have the ability to pay.
The recent advancement of payment systems and the shortage in the supply of
infrastructure followed by privatization, however, have weakened the nonrivalrous 
and nonexcludable features of infrastructure. For instance, energy, the railroad, harbor,
airport, internet, and even the expressway can be rendered excludable by the imposition
of a pricing system. Benefiting from the advancement of electronic charging systems
that depend on information technology, the supplier can accurately apply the user-pay
rule at low cost. Also, the congestion and the limited capacity of various forms of
transportation invalidate the nonrivalry assumption. London and Singapore, for instance,
apply a congestion charge to drivers, admitting the rivalrous nature of metropolitan
roads. The supporters of the privatization of infrastructure suggest that nonrivalry and
nonexcludability are not fundamental attributes of infrastructure and argue that infra-
structure can indeed be provided by the private sector.
Monopoly is another attribute of infrastructure. When the road is provided by a 
private company, the company can enjoy a monopoly if there are no alternative roads
to use. In such a case, the user fee can be set higher than the marginal cost, producing
a deadweight loss. Monopoly has other negative effects; it results in the undersupply
of infrastructure and gives rise to a political lobby for protecting the monopolistic
power of the suppliers. The monopolistic aspect of the private provision of infrastruc-
ture leads to market failure. To remedy this situation, therefore, many claim that the
government should intervene by providing and managing infrastructure. On this view,
infrastructure is understood as publicly provided goods rather than public goods.
The changing understanding of infrastructure is well reflected in the influx of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries in the 1990s. Despite the
investment risk due to political instability, weak institutions, and government regulation,
FDI has grown around the world. Ramamurti and Doh (2004, p. 151) list a number of
reasons that might account for this anomalous phenomena:
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Foreign investors may have believed: (1) that infrastructure sectors were losing
their “natural monopoly” characteristics; (2) that first-movers would profit hand-
somely from the emerging globalization of these sectors; (3) that novel techniques
like project financing would reduce their risks sharply; (4) that the climate for
FDI in developing countries had changed fundamentally in the 1990s; and (5) that
host developing countries would not expropriate foreign-owned infrastructure
assets as they had in the past.
However, Ramamurti & Doh also point out that FDI in infrastructure has not 
dissipated in the twenty-first century, which challenges these various explanations. 
Private companies and public sector conflicts are more common, and the risk of FDI 
is higher than expected. Hence, we can conclude that other factors like the role of 
the government and the nature of public goods are still important in infrastructure
investment in developing countries.
To sum, the conceptual definition of infrastructure is less theoretical than practical.
Although the fundamental differences between infrastructure and private goods have
been attenuated over the years, the idea that the government has a proactive role to
play in providing infrastructure is still valid and practically supported.
The Trend of Infrastructure Investment Supply and Demand in Korea
Infrastructure investment is the result of interactions between the demands of the
private sector and the suppliers which is mainly the government. To offer a balanced
account, we need to assess the role of the private and public sector equivalently. How-
ever, as the Korean government plays a proactive role in infrastructure investment, the
following discussion is mainly limited to how the Korean government has guided
infrastructure investment in Korea.
After the Korean civil war (1950-1953), the Korean government had to rebuild its
infrastructure, but it did not have enough financial resources to do so, nor did it have a
systematic master plan to guide infrastructure investment. To overcome this challenge,
in 1962, the Korean government introduced the first of what would be a series of 
economic development plans. The five-year economic development plan had been
was successively revised until 1996, reflecting changes in the economic and political
situation of Korea. It also clarified how infrastructure investment should be made so as
to achieve the planned economic development.
The five-year economic development plan reflected a number of basic principles.
The first was that the government should play a significant role in economic develop-
ment. The Korean government tightly controlled economic development, using the
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economic development plan to guide the allocation of budgets and to prioritize policies.
The president and cabinet members also monitored the achievement of the proposed
targets of the development plan every year.
The second was that economic development could be achieved through industrializa-
tion following the structural change theory proposed by W. Arthur Lewis (Todaro &
Smith, 2003). According to Lewis’s theory, economic development entails a transition
from an agricultural society to a modernized, urbanized, and industrialized society
with larger manufacturing and service industries. The Korean government decisively
introduced policies for nurturing secondary and tertiary industries, and it selected
regional growth centers that it intended to provide infrastructures for.
The third was that the lack of financial resources could be remedied by seeking 
foreign capital. The major companies that benefited from this influx of foreign capital
were not owned by the foreign investors. Instead, private companies borrowed the
money from the foreign investors, and the Korean government offered a credit guarantee
to them. Notably, while foreign capital was an important financial source of infrastructure
investment, the government maintained the authority to distribute the money. One result
of the government’s allocation of the foreign loans to a small number of companies
and the prevention of foreign investors from ownership stakes in private companies
was the formation of conglomerates (chaebol) in Korea.
The first five-year economic development plan (1962-1966) focused on light man-
ufacturing industries like the textile industry. Unlike other developing countries that
attempted to increase self-sufficiency and the domestic market, Korea sought economic
growth by encouraging exports. To expedite exporting, the Korean government built
industrial complexes and provided roads and railways to them.
In the second five-year economic development plan (1967-1971), the Korean 
government began to invest more in heavy industry, including the chemical, steel, and
machinery industries. To improve transportation of raw materials to the industrial
complexes, the government electrified the Jungang, Youngdong, and Taebak railways,
which passed through mountainous and mining areas. As these railways were mainly
used for transporting natural resources, the expansion of the railway to the regions did
not much improve the accessibility of trains for passenger traffic.
The takeoff stage of the Korean government’s infrastructure development started in
the 1970s. As shown in table 1, the urbanization rate in Korea was only 50.1% in
1970. Moreover, there were only 126,000 registered cars. Despite the low urbanization
rate, Korea experienced the upsurge of population in metropolitan areas, especially
Seoul, the capital of Korea. Seoul’s population in 1960 was around 244.5 million but had
increased to 544.3 million by 1970. Such an increase in the population of metropolitan
areas was a result of unbalanced economic development, as the Korean government
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had used the country’s limited national resources to develop strategically selected cities
and regions. To mitigate the urban traffic problem, in 1972 Korea began constructing
the subway system in Seoul.
In the 1970s, the government also expanded the road network to connect the
regional growth centers. The Gyeongbu expressway was completed in 1971, and other
interprovincial highways began to be constructed in the late 1970s. Although the
investment was to some extent designed to meet the demand for more roads, the primary
motivation was economic development. As economic development was the national
priority, an infrastructure investment plan was created in accordance with the five-year
economic development plans. Also, as infrastructure is closely related to regional
development, the Korean government introduced the first national land development
plan (1972-1981), which came to shape infrastructure investment.
Road and Railway Supply
Official statistics count both the paved and unpaved roads. As direct road investment
is more correlated with the length of paved road, we need to exclude the unpaved road
length. As the annual economic growth rate in the 1970s (30.29%) was higher than the
1980s (12.17%) as shown in table 1, we might expect a rapid increase in the number
of roads in the 1970s. However, as shown in figure 1, road supply grew dramatically
in the 1980s. In the 1980s, as shown in table 1, the number of cars increased at an
annual rate of around 20.5%. The government ought to have provided more roads in
the 1970s, but considering it can take five to seven years to plan and build a road and
how many new roads were needed, it was not possible for it to do so. This widened the
gap between the supply of and demand for road.
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Table 1. Korean Social and Economic Indicators, 1970-2010
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Annual Growth Rate
’70-80 ’80-90 ’90-00 ’00-10
Population
(1,000) 32,241 38,123 42,869 47,008 48,989 1.69% 1.18% 0.93% 0.41%
Urbanization 
rate (%) 50.1 68.7 81.9 87.7 90.9 3.21% 1.77% 0.69% 0.36%
GDP 
(million USD) 2,775 39,110 191,383 603,236 1,172,803 30.29% 17.21% 12.17% 6.87%
Number of 
Cars (1,000) 126 527 3,394 12,059 17,941 15.38% 20.47% 13.52% 4.05% 
Aware of the serious shortage of roads, the Korean government began to invest
more in them. One notable policy change was the establishment of the special trans-
portation fund in 1994,which was financed by the fuel tax. While the amount of the
special transportation tax changed over years, it is almost $15 billion USD as of 2012.
With this special transportation fund, the Korean government has access to the financial
sources to fund transportation infrastructure investment that are less affected by budget
shortfalls.
The continuous growth of road networks has raised two major concerns: inefficiency
and rising maintenance costs. As the most economically valuable roads have by now
been built, the economic benefits from new projects are limited. As the result, rapid
growth in road supply is no longer justified. In addition, since 2005, more than 30% 
of the total budget for roads has begun to be used for maintenance rather than new
construction. These factors have slowed down the increase of the number of roads in
Korea since the late 2000s.
As shown table 2, the congestion costs due to shortage of roads are still very high.
As of 2010, congestion costs were around $28 billion USD, and most of them arise in
urban areas. This implies that megaprojects connecting different regions are no longer
economically justifiable. Instead, a new investment policy that abates urban congestion
costs is necessary. Given the limited amount of land available, this new policy should
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Figure 1. Paved-Road Length, 1961-2011
Source: Korea Transportation Database, www.ktdb.go.kr
not call for more supply of roads in the cities. Instead, the government has to improve
the management of traffic systems by utilizing new information technologies, public
transportations, and railways.
Railway supply, in contrast to road supply, was pretty static until the mid-2000s.
As shown in figure 2, railway length did not change until 2003. To some extent, the
reason there was less investment in the railways was because for a lot of money was
spent on the Gyeongbu high-speed rail and subways.
By the 1990s, the government was coming under fire for the lack of investment in
the railways. In response to the criticism, in the 2000s it tried to improve the quality of
railways by changing the single-track railway to an electrified double-track. The primary
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Figure 2. Railway Length, 1980-2010
Source: Korea Transportation Database, www.ktdb.go.kr
Table 2. Korean Congestion Costs, 2004-2010 (in $100,000USD)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total Congestion Costs 231,156 235,396 246,215 261,723 269,027 277,055 285,090
Regional 91,305 90,937 91,803 96,838 98,810 100,643 104,361
(%) (39.5) (38.6) (37.3) (37.0) (36.7) (36.3) (36.6)
Urban 139,851 144,459 154,412 164,885 170,217 176,412 180,729
(%) (60.5) (61.4) (62.7) (63.0) (63.3) (63.7) (63.4) 
justification for this investment was that people would switch from using roads to
using the railways for their trips. However, the concentration of the population in
Seoul and Gyungi regions and the high accessibility of cars for door-to-door trips has
meant that there has not been a significant increase in the number of people using the
railways. As the result, while some support more investment in the railways, arguing
that trains are more environmentally friendly, railway traffic is still rather light, except
for on the Gyeongbu line, which many people use for long-distance travels.
Road and Railway Demand
Road demand is closely related to the number of registered cars. As mentioned, the
number of cars began to rapidly increase in the mid-1980s (see table 1). Between 1970
and 1984, the number of registered cars increased six times. However, the number
increased eight times between 1985 and 1998. The PPP GDP per capita of South
Korea in 1986 was around $4,900 USD, allowing more people to buy cars for travel
and business purposes.
Railway demand shows the different pattern from road demand. As shown in figure
3, the number of passengers using the railway has continuously increased since the
1980s. One might interpret this trend as the evidence of more demand for railways for
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Figure 3. Number of Railway Passengers, 1980-2010
Source: Korea Transportation Database, www.ktdb.go.kr
passenger travel. However, we should distinguish passenger travels between the
regions from travels within the Seoul metropolitan region. The increase of railway
passengers is mainly indebted to the latter, not the former. In the case of the number of
passengers traveling to different regions, railway use decreased 5.9% between 1995
and 2012. This implies that the railway as a mode for passenger traffic has weakened.
In addition, as shown in figure 4, the amount of freight transported by the railway
increased until mid-1990s but gradually decreased thereafter. This suggests that the
role of railway as a mode for transporting freight as well as passenger traffic has been
diminished.
Transportation Mode Change
The primary mode of transportation in Korea is the road. In 1970, 95.2% of 
passengers traveled by road, 4.6% by railway, 0.2% by ship, and 0.03% by airplane.
By 2009, the ratios had changed significantly: 74.8% traveled by road, 8.0% by 
railway, 17% by subway, 0.1% by airplane, and 0.1% by ship. The heavy reliance on
the subway is the related to urbanization and the concentration of the population in the
Seoul metropolitan region, where more than 25% of population live.
A significant proportion of freight traffic, like passenger traffic, is found on the
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Figure 4. Rail Freight, 1978-2010
Source: Korea Transportation Database, www.ktdb.go.kr
roads. In 1970, 59.3% of domestic freight was transported by road and 30.3% by 
railway. Notably, the used of railway to transport freight decreased in the 2000s. Its
contribution to freight traffic decreased to 5.1%.
In sum, infrastructure investment in Korea has largely taken the form of road
investment. While the railway was regarded as an important transportation mode for
conveying the freight in the 1970s, its role has gradually decreased. In defiance of
expectation, major infrastructure investment did not occur in the 1970s, when the
economy was growing rapidly. Instead, it was only once the GDP per capita reached
to $5,000 USD and the purchasing power of citizens increased in the 1980s that the
rapid increase in road supply took place.
Political Leadership and Infrastructure Investment
Most literature (Amsden, 1989) dealing with the economic development of Korea
suggests that the authoritarian leadership of President Park Jung-hee should be counted
as one of major factors contributing to it and frequently cite the Gyeongbu expressway
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Table 3. Proportion of Passenger Traffic by Mode of Transportation, 1970-2009 (%)
Road Railway Subway Ship Airplane
1970 66.0 32.3 0.0 0.8 0.9
1980 73.2 24.7 1.1 0.5 0.6
1990 66.3 22.1 8.3 0.4 3.0
2000 56.1 21.5 16.5 0.1 0.2
2009 61.3 19.1 14.7 0.5 4.3
Source: KOTI, 2012, 10. Passenger traffic volume is measured by million passenger-Km.
Table 4. Proportion of Freight Traffic by Mode of Transportation, 1970-2009 (%)
Road Railway Ship Airplane
1970 59.3 30.3 10.4 0.005
1980 60.5 28.4 11.1 0.01
1990 63.8 17.2 19 0.05
2000 73.4 6.7 19.9 0.06
2009 79.2 5.1 15.7 0.04
Source: KOTI, 2012, 13.
as a good example of his successful political leadership in infrastructure investment. In
contrast, the recent four-rivers development project (2009-2012) under the leadership
of President Lee Myung-bak turned out to be highly disappointing in its negative
impacts on environment. A review of these two cases can provide us with insight into
the pros and cons of political leadership in infrastructure investment. In the following,
we critically review these two cases and provide a counterexplanation to the positive
role attributed to political leadership.
The idea for the Gyeongbu expressway (a 428km expressway from Seoul to
Busan) was proposed by then-President Park in 1967 during his presidential election.
President Park did not have any concrete ideas as to the financial burden of the invest-
ment or the benefits and costs of the project. The original planning team proposed
W––38.4 billion but cut that to W––33 billion at the vice ministry meeting regarding the
economy. Once the project was being seriously considered, different figures were pro-
posed by different organizations. The Ministry of Construction proposed W––65 billion,
while Ministry of Finance proposed W––33 billion, Seoul City W––18 billion, the Korean
Army Corps of Engineers W––490 billion, and the Hyundai construction company W––28
billion. The Korean government finalized a budget of W––33 billion for the project in
1968, but the budget increased 30% to W––44 billion in 1969.1 Such a huge variation in
estimated project costs suggests that neither the president nor the Korean government
had the capacity to calculate the economic costs of the expressway investment.
The financing of the project was also problematic. When President Park first
announced the Gyeongbu expressway project, he claimed that the World Bank and
other international organizations would fund it.2 Also, some claimed that the project
costs were being financed by property claims against Japan. However, 95.6% of the
total projects cost was financed domestically by raising petroleum tax and appropriating
money from other budgets.
The expressway was also not highly used. Between 1971 and 1979, the number of
registered cars increased only from 140,000 to 490,000. As noted (see figure 3), a 
significant increase in the number of cars only occurred beginning in the early 1980s.
After the construction of the Gyeongbu expressway, the government realized that
demand for long-distance travel was low. As the consequence, the length of the
expressway changed little between 1975 (1,142km) and 1983 (1,245km).
Finally, the priority the investment was given was misplaced. Given that the total
construction costs of the project were around 8.4% of the 1970 budget of the Korean
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1. Korean National Archives, http://theme.archives.go.kr/next/gyeongbu/roadStatistics02.do.
2. Korean National Archives, http://theme.archives.go.kr/next/gyeongbu/roadCommemoration
01.do.
government, it could not spend money on other infrastructure investments, such as, in
particular, provincial roads. While both the opposition and majority party agreed to spend
more money on the construction of roads, unlike President Park, the opposition party
leaders such as Kim Dae-jung argued giving higher priority to national and provincial
roads than the expressway. Because it turned out that the Gyeongbu expressway was
not urgently needed as the government expected, the Park administration shifted its
policy direction, improving the quality of national and provincial roads rather than
constructing another expensive expressway. Hence, the percentage of paved national
roads increased from 28.3% in 1971 to 60.7% in 1979 and that of provincial roads
from 2.2% to 10.6%.
The other interesting case is the four-rivers development project initiated by President
Lee Myung-bak in 2009. The project costs were around W––22.2 trillion, and it was
completed in two years. President Lee justified the project by arguing that it would
contribute to managing water resources systematically, improve environmental quality,
and boost the economy.
However, compared to the Gyeongbu expressway project, the four-rivers project
had less support from citizens and opposition parties. According to public opinion
polls, the majority of citizens (51.0%) were opposed to undertaking the project.3 The
opposition parties and civil society organizations protested the project due to its 
economic infeasibility and environmental problems and because they believed it
would be ineffective in achieving the proposed goals. More importantly, the projected
was planned without the benefit of a proper policy analysis, for its master plan was
made within six months. Given that most infrastructure investment requires at least
three years for planning and policy analysis, it seems unlikely that the six months it
took to design a plan for the four-rivers development policy was enough. Of course, it
is too early to evaluate the effect of the four-rivers project. However, one thing that is
clear is that the political decision to proceed without the proper policy analysis having
been undertaken in the planning stages was not appropriate in a democratic society.
These two cases suggest that although strong political leadership can play a signifi-
cant role in infrastructure investment decisions, the choices a given administration
makes are not necessarily the best ones. Of course, Park and Lee governed in different
institutional settings, which limits our ability to draw generalizable conclusions. Yet
our review suggests that strong political leadership does not guarantee a given infra-
structure investment will be sound.
136 The Evolution of Infrastructure Investment of Korea
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
3. The survey was done by a survey company, Real Meter, in December 2009. In the survey,
only 35.9% of respondents supported the project.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE 
INVESTMENT PROCESS FROM PLANNING 
TO POSTEVALUATION
The Demand for Rational Public Investment Based on Policy Analysis
Before the 1990s, the priority of investment projects in Korea was determined
according to their contribution to economic development rather than by considerations
of regional equity or convenience of users before the 1990s. A few authoritative decision
makers decided which projects had priority, and public participation was limited, nor
did the process take other values much into account. Reflecting this lack of wider
input, there were no official guidelines for cost-benefit analyses proposed by the Korean
government before 1982. There were almost two dozen academic articles dealing with
public investment analysis methods such as cost-benefit analysis published before the
1980s, but most of them related to general planning and not to specific sectors.4
Hence, policy analysis for infrastructure projects mainly covered physical design or
ways to minimize construction costs.
Along with economic growth and democratization, however, the demand for rational
investment decision making grew in the 1990s. The weakened political leadership of
the central government brought out the conflicts that existed among interest groups.
Local governments began to devise their own regional development plans in the 1990s.5
When major national level infrastructure projects were proposed, however, citizens
paid more attention to various problems such as land use, housing, job creation,
regional equity, and environmental impact. Multiple interest groups established their
own priorities. Moreover, some megaprojects were huge failures. For instance, the
Gyeongbu high-speed railroad, the Busan second subway line, Yeo-Su airport, and the
Sae-Man-Geum landfill saw at least twofold cost increases and three years of project
delay (MOCT, 1999). These projects were independently implemented as a result of
political considerations, not as part of a systematically analyzed higher-level plan.
The growing demand for policy analysis also comes from the need to coordinate of
the local and central governments’ interests. Local governments tried to launch as many
projects as possible and tended to emphasize the importance of regional development.
The Evolution of Infrastructure Investment of Korea 137
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
4. I reviewed articles from DBPIA, www.dbpia.co.kr, and http://kiss.kstudy.com.
5. The major research institutes of local governments were established in the 1990s and include
Seoul Development Institute (1992), Busan Development Institute (1992), Kyeonggi
Development Institute (1994), and Incheon Development Institute (1995).
In contrast, the central government had to allocate budgets according to the national
agenda rather than in response to regional issues. Although we can resolve such a tension
between local and central governments with political bargains, a rational decision-
making process can help politicians and public officials arrive at an informed decision.
At the same time, cost-benefit analysis and other rational decision-making techniques
can improve the transparency of decisions, allowing others to straightforwardly evaluate
the validity of the analysis results.
Finally, infrastructure investment based on policy analysis can prevent the pork-
barrel spending of politicians for their district’s projects at the expense of social welfare.
For instance, although the National Assembly has no authority to increase the executive
branch’s proposed budget, politicians can indirectly ask the executive branch to insert
their district’s projects into the budget proposal that is then resubmitted to the National
Assembly for a vote. Policy analysis can undermine such political influence over infra-
structure investment by holding politicians responsible for their approval of economically
infeasible projects and thereby making it politically expensive for them to engage in
pork barreling.
As the result of the growing demand of rational policy making, the Korean govern-
ment introduced a systematic infrastructure investment management system shown in
figure 7. When an infrastructure investment project is proposed by local governments
or other related agencies, line ministries such as Ministry of Land and Transportation
(MOLT) internally review the feasibility of the projects and request a budget from the
Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF). MOSF reviews the proposed project by
asking the government think tank, Korea Development Institute (KDI), to conduct a
prefeasibility study (PSF). Around 40% of proposed projects by MOLT are rejected
owing to the results of the PSF. Even if the PSF result supports a project, MOLT 
performs another round of the feasibility studies to develop a concrete plan. MOLT
usually does not reject a project at the feasibility study stage, but it uses the feasibility
study results to prioritize projects that passed the PSF. After the National Assembly
reviews a project and budget approval has been granted, MOLT provides a schematic
and detailed outline of the project.
The next stage is the selection of a construction company. The Public Procurement
Service follows a standard procedure and selects the contractor. Although the total
project costs are confirmed at the stage of the procurement, project costs can change
due to a variety of reasons. When a contractor presents a claim indicating a change in
the project cost, MOSF systematically reviews the request using a total cost management
system. Using an electronic management system called D-brain to track changes in
costs, MOSF can prevent arbitrary changes in project costs. Finally, after completion
of the project, MOLT assesses whether the project achieved the intended goals using a
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postevaluation study.
Notably, this rational infrastructure management involves different ministries that
share the responsibility for overseeing infrastructure investment. This allows the govern-
ment to correct errors and address the unanticipated risks of investment decisions
made in the previous stage. Another other important feature is the PSF carried out by
MOST. As a gatekeeper of budgets, MOST cannot accept all projects proposals 
submitted by line ministries and should provide good reasons for rejecting a given
project. MOST uses the PSF as a major tool in making budgetary decisions connected
to infrastructure. In the following section, we discuss how the PSF works in Korea.
The Prefeasibility Study
In Korea, the feasibility study for infrastructure projects is mainly done by line
ministries such as MOLT. Line ministries contract the government think tanks, uni-
versity professors, and/or private companies to evaluate the economic, technical, and
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Figure 5. PFS Structure
Source: Park, 2007
policy feasibilities. The major drawback of the feasibility studies undertaken by line
ministries is that the results are not necessarily objective, as line ministries frequently
manage to influence the feasibility study team in such a way as to get it to produce
favorable results for them. As William Niskanen postulates, line ministries enjoy more
power by launching more projects with bigger budgets. Hence, the results of the 
feasibility studies led by line ministries tend to underestimate costs and overestimate
benefits.
MOSF became concerned about the validity of the results of line ministries’ feasi-
bility studies. For instance, between 1994 and 1998, only 1 out of a total of 32 projects
was disapproved by MOLT after feasibility studies were conducted. In response, in
1999 MOSF began independently performing its own PFSs. MOSF’s PFSs cover most
large-scale projects whose total costs are $50 million USD or more. As figure 7
shows, economic feasibility is evaluated using cost-benefit analysis. Policy feasibility
assesses environmental impact, effect on regional development, residents’ support of
the project, and other policy issues. As these economic and policy feasibility assess-
ments are beyond the expertise of MOSF public officials, the ministry asks KDI to
perform the PFSs.
Compared to line ministries’ feasibility studies, MOSF’s PFSs show a high level of
transparency. The primary feature enhancing the transparency of MOSF’s PFSs is the
multidisciplinary PFS team (Park 2007, p. 129). When KDI reviews a project, three or
more organizations are involved. A typical PFS team consists of KDI researchers, uni-
versity professors, and private company experts. These various participants have their
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Figure 6. Number of Newspaper Articles Referring to PFSs, 1999-2005
Source: Korea Transportation Database, www.ktdb.go.kr
own expertise, and the PFSs reflect their different views. The other feature is the open-
ness of MOSF’s PFS process. KDI invites external experts to review midterm and
final PFS reports. The reports are also reviewed by MOSF and line ministries, which
provide their own comments to KDI. In addition, as shown in figure 8, the public and
mass media have paid more attention to PFSs over the years. Once PFS results are
publicized, politicians whose district’s project is rejected cannot easily overturn the
PFS result. The mass media and competing politicians are quick to draw attention to
attempts on the part of politicians to allocate budgets despite unfavorable PFS results.
Hence, PFSs significantly reduce pork barreling in infrastructure investment projects
by securing a high level of transparency.
As PFSs increase the transparency of infrastructure investment, they have become
standard procedure in infrastructure investment decision-making in Korea. As shown
in table 5, as of 2010, more than 465 major infrastructure projects have received PFSs,
and around 40% of them have been rejected. This rejection rate is very high, especially
considering that most proposed projects evaluated through feasibility studies by the
Ministry of Land and Transportation in the 1990s were approved.
The PFS, however, is not perfect. While KDI performs an intensive cost-benefit
analysis, there is much room for improving the accuracy of the estimation of demands,
benefits, and costs. The project costs estimated by the PFS are different from what the
project ends up costing when it is actually implemented. Sometimes, there is a wide
gap between expected demand and actual demand. These inaccuracies are not the
result of bias but of limitations of available data and methodologies.
Acknowledging this limitation of policy analysis at the planning and decision stage,
the Korean government has introduced a total project cost management system. If there
is a large variation in project costs or demand, the Korean government reanalyzes the
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Table 5. Number of Infrastructure Projects Receiving a PFS, 1999-2010
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Road 11 11 20 10 12 23 11 27 30 11 21 4 191
Railway 2 7 14 7 6 12 6 11 5 2 5 6 83
Harbor 1 5 1 1 3 2 1 3 1 4 2 2 26
Airport 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4
Water 
Resource 1 1 0 5 3 0 0 1 1 2 12 6 32
Others 4 5 5 7 9 18 11 10 8 17 20 14 128
Total 19 30 41 30 33 55 29 52 45 37 61 32 464 
project feasibility. Also, the government puts the burden of proof on the construction
companies if they request a larger budget than that of original plan. With the total cost
management system, the government has been able to significantly reduce budget
waste.
Postevaluation Study
In 2000, the Korean government introduced a law requiring postevaluation studies
for infrastructure construction projects. According to the law, any construction projects
that costs more than $50 million USD should be evaluated within three years of comple-
tion. As of 2013, around 290 construction projects have received postevaluation studies.
As shown in table 6, only 37 out of 267 transportation projects performed a cost-benefit
analysis in the planning stages, which suggests that before MOSF began conducting its
independent PSFs in 1999, most projects were not performing a cost-benefit analysis
at their planning stage in the line ministries.
According to postevaluation results, around 91% of railway projects overestimated
demand, as did 63% of highway projects.6 Such a systematic overestimation of
demand goes along with the inflation of estimated net benefits of projects. While PFSs
have significantly contributed to reducing the arbitrary manipulation of net benefits of
infrastructure projects, inaccuracy in estimating and benefits and costs persists. Even
though such inaccuracy stems in part from methodological limitations and lack of suffi-
cient data used for estimation, we can still reasonably suspect that some infrastructure
projects are being implemented in the absence of economic considerations.
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6. The analysis was done by National Assembly member Minseok Park with the support of
National Assembly Budget Office.
Table 6. Number of Postevaluation Studies Performed since 2001
Number of Number of Projects Number of Projects 
Studies That Used Cost-Benefit That Used Demand Analysis Estimation
Transportation Projects 267 37 237
Other Projects 23 11 19
Total 290 48 256 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This article reviews how infrastructure investment has evolved over the decades in
Korea. Like other less developed countries, Korea has faced challenges in infrastruc-
ture provision such as a lack of usable investment funds, inexperience in planning and
managing megaprojects, political pork barreling, and unpredictable economic and
social conditions. Hence, neither the market nor government could solve these problems
independently.
Korea has benefited from using a systematic administrative process that rationalizes
rather than politicizes infrastructure investment decision. Less developed countries
usually face political instability, and so their infrastructure investment and other 
economic development plans tend not to be well coordinated because of the weak
institutionalization of the policy-making process. The Korean government has minimized
such political and administrative risks with two approaches: utilization of a strong
planning agency and performance monitoring. In 1961, the Korean government
empowered the Economic Planning Board (EPB) to design five-year economic plans,
which were politically supported as well, although there were conflicts between the
Ministry of Construction and Transportation and the EPB over budgets and prioritization
of projects that the five-year plans did not completely resolve . Mediation in these con-
flicts was provided by successive presidential administrations, which closely monitored
the outcomes of investment decision in the 1970s. Such performance monitoring forced
bureaucrats to commit to assiduous policy making and made clear who was responsible
for investment decisions. These planning and performance monitoring practices, in turn,
increased the managerial capacity of public organizations in infrastructure management.
One might claim that the political leadership is critical for successful infrastructure
investment in developing countries. Admittedly, infrastructure investment is not be
feasible without strong political support as it requires a considerable amount of national
resources. However, as the Gyeongbu expressway and the four-rivers project suggest,
political leadership without the relevant analytical information can lead to unsatisfactory
results. Moreover, political leadership is not a well-defined concept, and it will mean
different things in different countries depending on the level of democratization and
economic development. While there are a few exceptions, as the economy grows and
democracy further develops in Korea, most infrastructure decisions are being made
via rational policy-making processes such as the coordination of national and local
government development plans, the adoption of PFSs, total project cost management,
and postevaluation studies. This suggests that administrative capacity building for
making better infrastructure decisions is critical for the expansion of the infrastructure
of developing countries.
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The other important lesson to be drawn from the Korean government’s approach to
infrastructure investment is the wisdom of establishing stable funds to support it. In
1994, the Korean government established a special fund for transportation infrastructure
investment. The fund enabled the government to more accurately predict how much
money was available for infrastructure and helped it form long-term investment plans.
In addition, special funds can help the government facing the pressure of budget
deficits to avoid relying too much on private or foreign funds to supply infrastructure.
In fact, the government of developing countries tend to spend budgets on programs
whose benefits are immediately apparent to the public rather than on infrastructure,
whose benefits accrue over the long term. Therefore, if governments fail to create stable
funds earmarked for infrastructure investment, they will end up having to borrow
money at a higher cost from private and/or foreign investors.
Like other countries, Korea currently faces budget constraints, which makes it 
difficult to finance many projects. As a partial solution to the problem of budget 
constraints, the government has begun relying on private funds. Recent instances of
heightened public-private partnership, however, suggest that there is no guarantee that
the private sector will provide a low-cost, high quality infrastructure, as it has its own
interests, not those of the public, at heart. In particular, because the government faces
information asymmetry when it makes a contract with private firms, it unduly under-
takes financial risks by guaranteeing a minimum revenue to private investors. At the
same time, the government has to pay managerial costs that arise from the private-
interest maximization behaviors of private companies.
How to manage the public-private partnership is also a challenge for many develop-
ing countries that rely on FDI for the supply of infrastructure. To alleviate the informa-
tion asymmetry between the private and public sectors, governments need to engage in
rational policy analysis to assess economic and policy feasibility. While rational policy
analysis is not perfect, as the Korean experience suggests, its institutionalization can
help governments improve their administrative capacity. At the same time, it forces
the private sector to reveal its concealed information, which mitigates the information
asymmetry. Therefore, better planning and analysis is the right way for developing
countries to improve infrastructure investment.
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